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is my opinion that his condition of his knee 
and the disability resulting from it is not 
the result of the injury sustained in May of 
1964." While this evidence might have 
supported a conclusion that none of Berry's 
disability could be attributed to his employ-
ment, the iSStle of industrial causation was 
not before the board since this matter had 
been determined favorably to Berry in the 
1965 proceedings and was res judicata. If 
a disability is established to be the result of 
an industrial injury, a finding of apportion-
ment between industrial and nonindustrial 
causes cannot be supported by prior medical 
testimony that the employee's disability was 
entirely unconnected with his employment. 
The board may rest a decision only on med-
ical reports that are germane. (Jones v. 
Workmen's Compo App. Bd. (1968) 68 A.C. 
490, 494, 67 Ca!.Rptr. 544, 439 P.2d 648.) 
The board noted in its opinion th~t Dr. 
Parker related it was possible Berry :would 
become considerably worse and ; might 
eventually succumb to the disease. The 
opinion states that in view of this evidence 
it would be neither fair nor lawful t6 hold 
the employer responsible for the preexisting 
condition Hor the natural progress thereof," 
and that the conclusion on the issue of ap-
portionment might be different if Berry's 
disease could be cured so that he could be 
restored to the same condition he was in 
prior to his industrial injury or if his overw 
all disability could be reduced by treatment. 
[3] While these qualifying observations 
indicate the board was reluctant to follow 
the referee's recommendation because of 
concern that failure to apportion would im-
pose an onerous burden on the employer in 
view of the permanence and seriousness of 
Berry's illness, they do not establish that 
apportionment is justified. In Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Commission (1946) 73 Ca!.App.2d 555, 166 
P.2d 908, it was said, "It is now too well 
settled in this state to require extended ci-
tation of authority that the employee is en-
titled to compensation for disability proxi-
mately caused by industrial injury regard-
less of whether the employee's condition at 
the time of injury was average or subnor-
mal. Thus, an aggravation of an existing 
infirmity where such aggravation is proxi-
mately caused by the employment is com~ 
pensable, even though a normal man would 
not have been adversely affected. This 
rule applies even though it is shown that 
the employee would have ultimately died 
from such disease, if the evidence shows 
and the commission finds that the inj ury 
hastened or produced his death. (Sce many 
cases collected 1 Campbell, Workmen's 
Compensation, § 104, p. 80, particularly in 
fn. 115.) Industry takes the employee as it 
finds him. A person suffering from a pre-
existing disease who is disabled by an in-
jury proximately arising out of the employ-
ment is entitled to compensation even 
though a normal man would not have been 
adversely affected by the event." (73 Cal. 
App.2d at pp. 55S-559, 166 P.2d at p. 911.) 
[4] The decision of the board is an-
nulled and the cause is remanded to the 
board for further proc~cdings consistent 
with the views expressed herein. 
TRAYNOR, C. J., and McCOMB, PE-
TERS, TO BRINER, BURKE, and SUL-
LIVAN, JJ., concur. 
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Action by plaintiff for wrongful death 
of child, for damages to the plaintiff be~ 
cause of emotional shock and physical in-
jury and for damages on behalf of de-
DILLON v. LEGG 
Cite as 441 P .2d 912 
Cal. 913 
ceased's infant sister who witnessed fatal 
accident allegedly caused by negligence of 
defendant motorist. The Superior Court, 
Sacramento County, Robert W. Cole, J., 
granted defendant motorist a summary 
judgment on the mother's cause of action 
for emotional shock and physical injury to 
herself and the mother appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tobriner, J., held that mother 
asserting emotional trauma and physical 
injury from the witnessing, in close prox-
imity, of the death of her child as a result 
of defendant motorist's negligent operation 
of automobile alleged a sufficient prima 
facie case against motorist. 
Reversed. 
Traynor, C. J" and Burke and Mc-
Comb, JJ., dissented. 
I. Damages (t;;)51 
If defendant motorist were found not 
liable for death of child because of con-
tributory negligence of mother, sister or 
deceased child, neither mother nor sister 
who were close by should be allowed to 
recover for emontional trauma they alleged-
ly suffered in watching accident. 
2. Damages ~51 
Basis of claims for damages for emo-
tional trauma sustained by third parties who 
witnessed negligent act of defendant must 
be the adjudicated liability and fault of de-
fendant. 
3. courts <S=>87 
Possibility that some fraud will escape 
detection does not justify abdication of ju-
dicial responsibility to award damages for 
sound claims. 
4. Damages ~52 
Plaintiff claiming fear for his own 
safety resulted in physical injury is a well 
recognized case for recovery of damages. 
5. Damages ~26 
Law of torts holds defendant amenable 
only for injuries to others which to defend-
ant at time were reasonably foreseeable. 
441 P.2d-58 
6. Damages ~51 
In case of a shock resulting in physical 
injury because of witncssing defendant's 
ncgligent act toward another, 'in determin-
ing whether defendant should have reason-
ably foreseen injury to plaintiff or whether 
defendant owed plaintiff duty 'of due care, 
courts will consider: whether plaintiff was 
located near scene of accident; whether 
shock resulted from direct emotional impact 
on plaintiff from sensory and contempo-
raneous observance of accident; and 
whether plaintiff and victim were closely 
related. 
7. Damages ~51 
After consideration of the factors en-
tering into determination of degree of de-
fendant's foreseeability of injury to plain-
tiff from emotional shock as result,of wit-
nessing a negligent act, court will,determine 
whether accident and harm was reasonably 
foreseeable which turns not on whether 
particular defendant as individual would 
have in actuality foreseen exact accident 
and loss but whether ordinary man under 
circumstances should reasonably have fore-
seen. 
8. Damages ~149 
Mother's complaint asserting emotional 
trauma and physical injury from the wit-
nessing, in close proximity, of the death of 
her child as a result of defendant motorist's 
negligent operation of automobile alleged a 
sufficient prima facie case against motorist. 
9. Damages ~51 
Damages may be recovered for emo-
tional trauma and physical injury resulting 
from plaintiff's witnessing of accident in 
which closely related person is injured or 
killed by negligent act of defendant if ordi-
nary man should have foreseen 'injury to 
plaintiff: overruling Amaya v. Home Ice, 
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513. 
Bradford, Cross, Dahl & Hefner, Archie 
Hefner and James M. Woodside, Sacra-
mento, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
--~ ...... -~--------
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IVIcGregor, Bullen, Erich & McKone, 
George Bullen and William C. McKinley, 
Sacramento, 'for defendant and respondent. 
TOBRINER, Justice. 
That the ,courts should allow recovery 
to a mother who suffers emotional trauma 
and physical injury from witnessing the 
infliction of death or injury to her child 
for which the tort-feasor is liable in negli-
gence would appear to be a compelling 
proposition. As Prosser points Qut, HAll 
ordinary human feelings are in favor of 
her [the mother's] action against the neg-
ligent defendant. If a duty to her re-
quires that she herself be in some recog-
nizable danger, then it has properly been 
said that when a child is endangered, it is 
not beyond contemplation that its mother 
will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will 
suffer serious shock." (Prosser, Law of 
Torts (3d ed. 1964) p.353.) 
Nevertheless, past American decisions 
have barred the mother's recovery. Refus-
ing the mother the right to take her case 
to the jury, these courts ground their posi-
tion on an alleged absence of a required 
"duty" of due care of the tortfeasor to the 
mother. Duty, in turn, they state, must ex-
press public policy; the imposition of duty 
here would work disaster because it would 
invite fraudulent claims and it would in-
volve the courts in the hopeless task of de-
fining ,the extent of the tortfeasor's lia-
bility. In substance, they -say, definition 
of liability being impossible, denial of lia-
bility is the only realistic alternative. 
We have concluded that neither of the 
feared dangers excuses the frustration of 
the natural justice upon which the mother's 
claim rests. We shall point out that in the 
past we have rejected the argument that 
we should deny recovery upon a legitimate 
claim because other fraudulent ones may 
be urged. We shall further explain that 
the alleged inability to fix definitions for 
recovery on the different facts of future 
cases does not justify the denial of recovery 
I. For convenience, plaintiff will be used 
in the singular to denote the mother, 
on the specific facts of the instant case; 
in any event, proper guidelines can indicate 
the extent of liability for such future 
cases. 
In the instant case plaintiff's 1 first cause 
of action alleged that on or about Septem-
ber 27, 1964, defendant drove his automobile 
b a southerly direction on Bluegrass Road 
near its intersection with Clover Lane in 
the County of Sacramento, and at that time 
plaintiff's infant daughter, Erin Lee Dillon, 
lawfully crossed Bluegrass Road. The 
complaint further alleged that defendant's 
negligent operation of his vehicle caused 
it to "collide with the deceased Erin Lee 
Dillon resulting in injuries to decedent 
which proximately resulted in her death." 
(Complaint, p. 3.) Plaintiff, as the mother 
of the decedent, brought an action for com-
pensation for the loss. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleged 
that she, Margery M. Dillon, "was in close 
proximity to the * * * collision and 
personally witnessed said collision." She 
further alleged that "because of the negli-
gence of defendants * * * and as a 
proximate cause [sic] thereof plaintiff 
* * * sustained great emotional dis-
turbance and shock and injury to her 
nervous system" which caused her great 
physical and mental pain and suffering. 
Plaintiff's third cause of action alleged 
that Cheryl Dillon, another infant daugh-
ter, was "in close proximity to the * * * 
collision and personally witnessed said 
collision." Because of the negligence, 
Cheryl Dillon "sustained great emotional 
disturbance and shock and injury to her 
nervous system," which caused her great 
physical and mental pain and suffering. 
On December 22, 1965, defendant, after 
he had filed his answer, moved for judg-
ment on the pleadings, contending that 
"No cause of action is stated in that 
allegation that plaintiff sustained emo-
tional distress, fright or shock induced 
by apprehension of negligently caused 
although n minor sister is joined as plain-
tiff. 
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danger or injury or the witnessing of to the mother because she was not within 
negligently caused injury to a third per- the zone of danger and denied that motion 
son. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply as to the third cause involving Cheryl 
Co., 59 Ca1.2d 295, 29 Ca1.Rptr. 33, 379 because of the possibility that she was 
P.2d 513 (1963). Even where a child, within such zone of danger or feared for 
sister or spouse is the object of the plain- her own safety. Thus we have before us 
tiff's apprehension no cause of action is a case that dramatically illustrates the 
stated, Supra, p. 303, 29 Ca1.Rptr. 33, difference in result flowing from the 
379 P.2d 513, unless the complaint alleges alleged requirement that a plaintiff cannot 
that the plaintiff suffered emoti<onal dis- recover for emotional trauma in witness-
tress, fright or shock as a result of fear ing the death of a child or sister unless 
for his own safety. Reed v. Moore, 156 she also feared for her own safety because 
Cal.App.2d 43 (1957) at page 45 [319 P.2d she was actually within the zone of physi-
80]." (Italics added.) The court granted cal impact. 
a judgment on the pleadings against the 
mother's count, the second cause of action, 
and denied it as to the sister's count, the 
third cause of action. The court, further, 
dismissed the second cause of action. 
Margery M. Dillon, the mother appealed 
from that judgment. 
Thereafter, on January 26, further pro-
ceedings took place as to the third cause 
of action, Cheryl Dillon's claim for emo-
tional trauma from witnessing her sister's 
death while "watching her sister lawfully 
cross Bluegrass Road." 
Defendant moved for summary judg-
ment on this count. In opposition plain-
tiff contended that the declaration of one 
McKinley disclosed that Mrs. Dillon testi-
fied at her deposition that when she saw 
the car rolling over Erin she noted that 
Cheryl was on the curb, but that the 
deposition of Cheryl Dillon contradicts 
such statements. Plaintiff therefore sub-
mitted that HSince the declarations filed 
by defendant are contradictory and the 
testimony contained in the testimony of 
Mrs. Dillon does not establish as a matter 
of law that Cheryl Dillon was not in the 
zone of danger or had fear for her own 
safety, plaintiff respectfully submits that 
the motion must be denied." 
The court denied the motion for sum-
mary judgment on the third cause as to 
Cheryl on the ground that the pretrial 
order precluded it. The trial court" appar-
ently sustained the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings on the second cause as 
The posture of this case differs from 
that of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Sup-
ply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 298, 29 
Cal.Rptr. 33, 35, 379 P.2d 513, 515, which 
involved Hfright or nervous shock (with 
consequent bodily illness) induced solely 
by * * * apprehension of negligently 
caused danger or injury to a third person" 
because the complaint here presents the 
claim of the emotionally traumatized 
mother, who admittedly was not within 
the zone of danger, as contrasted with 
that of the sister, who may have been 
within it. The case thus illustrates the 
fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery 
in the one situation and grant it in the 
other. In the first place, we can hardly 
justify relief to the sister for trauma which 
she suffered upon apprehension of the 
child's death and yet deny it to the mother 
merely because of a happenstance that the 
sister was some few yards closer to the 
accident. The instant case exposes the 
hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger 
rule. In the second place, to rest upon the 
zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected 
the impact rule becomes even less defen-
sible. We have, indeed, held that impact is 
not necessary for recovery (Cook v. Maier 
(1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 581,584,92 P.2d 434.) 
The zone-of-danger concept must, then, in-
evitably collapse because the only reason for 
the requirement of presence in that zone 
lies in the fact that one within it will fear 
the danger of impact. At the threshold, 
then, we point to the incongruity of the 
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rules upon which any rejection of plaintiff's 
recovery must rest. 
[1,2] We further note, at the outset, 
that defendant has interposed the defense 
that the contributory negligence of the 
mother, the sister, and the child contributed 
to the accident. I f any such defense is 
sustained and defendant found not liable for 
the death of the child because of the con-
tributory negligence of the mother, sister 
or child, we do not believe that the mother 
or sister should recover for the emotional 
trauma which they allegedly suffered. In 
the absence of the primary liability of the 
tort-feasor for the death of the child, we 
see no ground for an independent and sec-
ondary liability for claims for injuries by 
third parties. The basis for such c1aims 
must be adjudicated liability and fault of 
defendant; that liability and fault must 
be the foundation for the tort-feasor's duty 
of due care to third parties who, as a 
consequence of such negligence, sustain 
emotional trauma. 
We turn then to an analysis of the 
concept of duty, which, as we have stated, 
has furnished the ground for th~ rejection 
of such claims as the instant one. 'Normally 
the simple facts of plaintiff's complaint 
would establish a cause of action: the 
complaint alleges that defendant drove his 
car (I) negligently, as a (2) proximate 
result of which plaintiff suffered (3) 
physical injury. Proof of these facts 
to a jury leads to recovery in damages; 
indeed, such a showing represents a classic 
example of the type of accident with which 
the law of negligence 'has been designed 
to deal. 
2. "rl'he gradual development of the law in 
the matter of civil Jiability is discussed 
and traced by the late Sir William Holds-
worth with ample learning and lucidity 
in his History 'of English Luw, vol. 8, 
pp. 446 et seq., and need not here be re-
hearsed. Suffice it to say that the proc-
ess of evolution has been from the prin-
ciple that every man acts at his peril and 
is liable for all the consequcnccs of his 
ncts to the principle that a man's free-
dom of action is ,subject only to the ob-
The assertion that liability must never-
theless be denied because defendant bears 
no "duty" to plaintiff "begs the essential 
question-whether the plaintiff's interests 
are entitled to legal protection against 
the defendant's conduct. * * * It 
[duty 1 is a shorthand statement of a con-
clusion, rather than an aid to analysis 
in itself. * * * But it should be rec-
ognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in 
itself, but only an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the par-
ticular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 
(Prosser, Law of Torts, supra, at pp. 
332-333.) 
The history of the concept of duty in 
itself discloses that it is not an old and 
deep-rooted doctrine but a legal device 
of the latter half of the nineteenth century 
designed to curtail the feared propensities 
of juries toward liberal awards. "It must 
not be forgotten that 'duty' got into our 
law for the very purpose of combatting 
what was then feared to be a dangerous 
delusion (perhaps especially prevalent 
among juries imbued with popular notions 
of fairness untempered by paramount 
judicial policy), viz. that the law might 
countenance legal redress for all fore-
seeable harm." (Fleming, An Introduction 
to the Law of Torts (1967) p. 47.) 
Indeed, the idea of court-imposed re-
strictions on recovery by means of the 
concept of "duty" contrasted dramatically 
with the preceding legal system of feudal 
society.2 In the enclosed feudal society, 
the actor bore responsibility for any dam-
age he inflicted without regard to whether 
he was at fault or owed a "duty" to the 
ligation not to infringe any duty of care 
which he owes to others. The emphasis 
formerly was on the injury sustained and 
the question was whether the case fell 
within one of the accepted classes of com-
mon law actions; the emphasis now is 
on the conduct of the person whose act 
has occasioned the injury and the ques-
tion is whether it can be characterized as 
negligent." (Read v. J. Lyons & Co., 
Ltd. (1947) A.C. 156, 171.) 
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injured person. Thus, at that time, the confronted by irreconcilable expert medical 
defendant owed a duty to all the world testimony, will be unable to distinguish the 
to conduct himself without causing injury deceitful from the bona fide. The argu-
to his fellows. It may well be that the ment concludes that only a per se rule 
physical contraction of the feudal society denying the entire class of claims that po-
imposed an imperative for maximum tentially raises this administrative prob-
procurable safety and a corresponding ab- tern 3 can avoid this danger. 
solute responsibility upon its members. 
The Industrial Revolution, which cracked 
the solidity of the feudal society and 
opened up wide and new areas of ex-
pansion, changed the legal concepts. Just 
as the new competitiveness in the economic 
sphere figuratively broke out of the walls 
of the feudal community, so it broke 
through· the rule of strict liability. In the 
place of strict liability it introduced the 
theory that an action for negligence would 
lie only if the defendant breached a duty 
which he owed to plaintiff. As Lord 
Esher said in Le Lievre v. Gould (1893) 
1 Q.B. 491, 497: "A man is entitled to 
be as negligent as he pleases towards the 
whole world if he owes no duty to them." 
We have pointed out that this late 19th 
century concept of duty, as applied to the 
instant situation, has led the courts to 
deny liability. We have noted that this 
negation of duty emanates from the twin 
fears that courts will be flooded with an 
onslaught of (1) fraudulent and (2) in-
definable claims. \Ve shall point out why 
we think neither fear justified. 
1. This court in the past has rejected 
the argument that we must deny 
recovery upon a legitimate claim be-
cause other fraudulent ones may be 
urged. 
The denial of "duty" in the instant situa-
tion n:sts upon the prime hypothesis that 
allowance of such an action would lead to 
successful assertion of fraudulent claims. 
(See, e. g., Waube v. Warrington (1935) 
216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.w. 497.) The 
rationale apparently assumes that juries, 
3. To the extent that this argument shade~ 
into the contention that such claims' 
should be denied because otherwise courts 
would experience a "flood of litigation," 
we point out that courts are responsible 
In the first instance, the argument pro-
ceeds from a doubtful factual assumption. 
Whatever the possibilities of fraudulent 
claims of physical injury by disinterested 
spectators of an accident, a question not 
in issue in this case, we certainly cannot 
doubt that a mother who sees her child 
killed will suffer physical injury from 
shock. HIt seems sufficiently obvious that 
the shock of a mother at danger or harm 
to her child may be both a real and a ser-
ious injury." (Prosser, Law of Torts, 
supra, at p. 353.) 
Over a half-century ago this court recog-
nized the likelihood that such fright and 
fear would cause physical injury. In 
Sloane v .. Southern California Ry. Co. 
(1896) 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322, we 
affirmed a Judgment for damages for a 
plaintiff who alleged physical injury re-
sulting from mental suffering, saying: 
HIt is a matter of general knowledge that 
an attack of sudden fright or an exposure 
to imminent peril has produced in individ-
uals a complete change in their nervous 
system, and rendered one who was physi-
cally strong and vigorous weak and timid." 
Since no one can seriously question that 
fear or grief for one's child is as likely to 
cause physical injury as concern over one's 
own well-being, rejection of the fraudulent 
claims contention in Sloane clearly applies 
here. 
In the second instance, and more funda-
mentally, the possibility that fraudulent as-
sertions may prompt recovery in isolated 
cases does not justify a wholesale rejection 
of the entire class of claims in which that 
for dealing with cases on their merits, 
whether there be few suits or many; the 
existence of n multitude of claims mere-
ly shows society's pressing need for leg,ll 
redress. 
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potentiality arises. The ('contention that 
the rule permitting the maintenance of the 
action would be impractical to administer 
* '" '" is but an argument that the courts 
are incapable of performing their appointed 
tasks, a premise which has frequently been 
rejected." (Emden v. Vitz (1948) 88 Cal. 
App.2d 313, 319, 198 P.2d 696, 700.) 
"[F]ear that unfounded claims may be put 
forward, and may result in erroneous con-
clusions of fact, ought not to influence us 
to impose legal 1imitations as to the nature 
of the facts that it is permissible to prove." 
(Owens v. Liverpool Corp. (1939) 1 K.B. 
394, 400.) "Certainly it is a very q~estion­
able position for a court to take, that be-
cause of the possibility of encouraging 
fictitious claims compensation should be 
denied those who have actually suffered 
serious inj ury through the negligence of 
another." (Orlo v. Connecticut Co. (1941) 
128 Conn. 231,239, 21 A.2d 402, 405. See 
also Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area 
of Risk (1953) 16 Modern L.Rev. 14, 23; 
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, supra, 
34 Harv.L.Rev. 260, 276.) 
On the analogous issue of whether the 
possibility of collusive fraud in intrafamily 
tort actions justified a per se rule denying 
recovery in all such cases, this court held 
that the interests of meritorious plaintiffs 
should prevail over alleged administrative 
difficulties. Upholding the claim of a mi-
nor child in that situation we said: "The 
interest of the child in freedom from per-
sonal injury_caused by the tortious conduct 
of others is sufficient to outweigh any dan-
ger of fraud or collusion. * * * [T]he 
fact that there may be greater opportunity 
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases 
than another does not warrant courts of law 
in closing the door to all cases of that class. 
Conrts must depend upon the efficacy of the 
judicial processes to ferret out the merito-
rious from the fraudulent in particular 
cases." (Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal.2d 
421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 224; see also Klein 
4. California's rule that plaintiff's fear for 
his own safety is compensable also pre-
v. Klein (1962) 58 Cal.2d 692, 695-696, 26 
Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70.) 
[3] The possibility that some fraud will 
escape detection does ~ot justify an abdica-
tion of the judical responsibility to award 
damages for sound claims: if it is "to be 
conceded that our procedural system for the 
ascertainment of truth is inadequate to de-
feat fraudulent claims * * *, the result 
is a virtual acknowledgment that the courts 
are unable to render justice in respect to 
them." (Chiuchiolo v. New England 
Wholesale Tailors (1930) 84 N.H. 329, 335, 
150 A. 540, 543.) 
Indubitably juries and trial courts, con-
stantly called upon to distinguish the friv-
olous from' the substantial and the fraud-
ulent from the meritorious, reach some 
erroneous results. But such fallibility, in-
herent in the judicial process, offers no rea-
son for substituting for the case-by-case 
resolution of causes an artificial and inde-
fensible barrier. Courts not only compro-
mise their basic responsibility to decide the 
merits of each case individually but destroy 
the public's confidence in them by using the 
broad broom of "administrative conven-
ience" to sweep away a class of claims a 
number of which are admittedly meritorious. 
The mere assertion that fraud is possible, 
"a possibility [that] exists to some degree in 
all cases" (Klein v. Klein, supra, 58 CaI.2d 
692, 695, 26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 104, 376 P.2d 70, 
72), does not prove a present necessity to 
abandon the neutral principles of foresee-
ability, proximate cause and consequential 
injury that generally govern tort law. 
[4] Indeed, we doubt that the problem 
of the fraudulent claim is substantially 
more pronounced in the case of a mother 
claiming physical injury resulting from 
seeing her child killed than in other areas 
of tort law in which the right to recover 
damages is well established in California. 
For exaIPple, a plaintiff claiming that fear 
for his own safety resulted in physical in-
jury makes out a well recognized case for 
recovery.' (Lindley v. Knowlton (1918) 
sents n strong argument for the same rule 
as to fear for others; otherwise, some 
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179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440; Webb v. Francis irate customer (I de S et ux v. W de S, Y.B. 
J. Lewald Coal Co. (1931) 214 Cal. 182,4 22 Edw. iii, f. 99, pI. 60 (1348)), defendants 
P.2d 532; Vanoni v. Western Airlines have argued that plaintiffs' claims of injury 
(1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 793, 56 CaI.Rptr.. from emohonal trauma might well be 
115.) Moreover, damages are allowed for fraudulent. Yet we cannot let the diffi-
"mental suffering," a type of injury, on the culties of adjudication frustrate the prin-
whole, less amenable to objective proof than cipIc that there be a remedy for every sub-
the physical injury involved here; the rnen- stantial wrong. 
tal injury can be in aggravation of, or 
"parisitic to," an established tort. (Sloane 
v. Southern California Ry. Co., supra, 111 
Cal. 668, 44 P. 320; Acadia, California, 
Ltd. v. Herbert (1960) 54 Cal.2d 328, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 686, 353 P.2d 294; Easton v. United 
Trade School Contracting Co. (1916) 173 
Cal. 199, 159 P. 597.) In fact, fear for an-
other, even in the absence of resulting phys-
ical injury, can be part of these parisitic 
damages. (Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Her-
bert, supra, 54 Cal.2d 328, 337, 5 Cal.Rptr. 
686, 353 P.2d 29-1; Easton v. United Trade 
School Contracting Co., supra, 173 Cal. 199, 
2. The alleged inability to fix defini-
tions for recovery on the different 
facts of future cases does not justify 
the denial of recover'}' on the specific 
facts of the instant case; in any 
event, proper gu£delines can indicate 
the extent of liability for such future 
cases. 
[5] In order to limit the otherwise po-
tential infinite liability which would follow 
every negligent act, the law of torts holds 
defendant amenable only for inj uries to 
others which to defendant at the time were 
202, 159 P. 597.) And emotional distress, reasonably foreseeable. 
if inflicted intentionally, constitutes an in-
dependent tort. (State Rubbish Collectors 
Ass'n v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal.2d 330, 
338, 2-10 P.2d 282.) The danger of plain-
tiffs' fraudulent collection of damages for 
nonexistent injury is at least as great in 
these examples as in the instant case. 
In sum, the application of tort law can 
never be a matter of mathematical pre-
cision. In terms of characterizing conduct 
as tortious and matching a money award 
to the injury suffered as well as in fixing 
the extent of injury, the process cannot be 
perfect. Undoubtedly, ever since the an-
cient case of the tavern-keeper's wife who 
successfully avoided the hatchet cast by an 
lllaintiffs will falsely claim to have feared 
for themselves, and the honest parties 
unwilling to do so will be penalized. (Cf. 
2 Harper & .James, The Law of Torts 
(1956) § 16.15, p. 961.) Moreover, it is 
incongruous and somewhat revolting to 
sanction recovery for the mother if she 
suffers shock from fear for her own safe-
ty and to deny it for shock from the wit-
nessed death of her own daughter. rro 
the layman such a ruling must appear 
incomprehensible; for the courts to rely 
upon self-contradictory legalistic abstrac-
tions to justify it is indefensible. 'Ye 
In the absence of "overriding policy con-
siderations * * * foreseeability of risk 
[is] of * * * primary importance in 
establishing the element of duty." (Grafton 
v. Mol1ica (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 860, 865, 
42 Cal.Rptr. 306, 310. See also McEvoy v. 
American Pool Corp. (19-18) 32 Ca1.2d 295, 
195 P.2d 783; Hergenrether v. East (1961) 
61 Cal.2d 440, 39 Ca1.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 16-1.) 
As a classic opinion states: "The risk rea-
sonably to be perceived defines the duty to 
be obeyed." (Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
Co. (1928) 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 
100.) Defendant owes a duty, in the sense 
of a potential liability for damages, only 
with respect to those risks or hazards whose 
concur with Judge Magruder's observa-
tion in 49 Harvard Law Review 1033, 
at IHlge 1039: "Once accepting the view 
t1mt [l plaintiff threatened with fID inju-
rious impact may recover for bodily harm 
resulting from shock without imlluct, it 
is easy to agree with Atkin, L.J. «(Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] '1 KB. 
141, 158-159]), tlmt to hinge recovery 
on the speculative issue wlleth~r the 
parent was Shocked through feur for het'-
self or for her children 'would be (lis-
creditable to any system of jurispru-
dence.' " 
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likelihood made the conduct unreasonably 
dangerous,' 'and hence negligent, in the first 
instance. (See Keeton, Legal Cause in the 
Law of Torts (1963) 18-20; Seavey, Mr. 
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts 
(1939) 52 Harv.L.Rev. 372; Seavey, Prin-
ciples of Torts (1942) 56 Harv.L.Rev. 72.) 
Harper and James state the prevailing 
view. The obligation turns on whether 
"the offending conduct foreseeabIy involved 
unreasonably great risk of harm to the in-
terests of someone other than the actor. 
* * * [T]he obligation to refain from 
* * * particular conduct is owed only to 
those who are foreseeably endangered by 
the conduct and only with respect to those 
risks or hazards whose likelihood made the 
conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in 
other words, is measured by the scope of 
the risk which negligent conduct foresee-
ably entails." (2 Harper & James, The 
Law of Torts, supra, at p. 1018; fns. omit-
ted.) 
This foreseeable risk may be of two types. 
The first ciass involves actual physical im-
pact. A second type of risk applies to the 
instant situation. "In other cases, however, 
plaintiff is outside the zone of physical risk 
(or there is no risk of physical impact at 
all), but bodily injury or sickness is brought 
on by emotional disturbance which in turn 
is caused by defendant's conduct. Under 
general principles recovery should be had 
in such a case if defendant should foresee 
fright or shock severe enough to cause sub-
stantial injury in a person normally con-
stituted. Plaintiff would then be within the 
zone of risk in very much the same way 
as are plaintiffs to whom danger is extend-
ed by acts of third persons, or forces of 
nature, or their own responses (where these 
things are foreseeable)." (2 Harper & 
5. The concept of the zone of danger can-
not properly be restricted to the area of 
those exposed to ph11sical injury; it 
Illu'>t encompass the area of those eX-
posed to emoUonal injury. The courts, 
today, hold that no distinction can be 
drawn between physical injury and emo-
tional injury flowing from the physical 
lDJury; indeed, in the light of modern 
medical knowledge, any such distinction 
James, The Law of Torts, supra, at pp. 
1035-1036; fns. omitted.)" 
Since the chief element in determining 
whether defendant owes a duty or an ob-
ligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of 
the risk, that factor will be of prime con-
cern in every case. Because it is inherently 
intertwined with foreseeability such duty 
or obligation must necessarily be adjudi-
cated only upon 'a case-by-case basis. We 
cannot now predetermine defendant's obli-
gation in every situation by a fixed cate-
gory; no immutable rule can establish the 
extent of that obligation for every circum-
stance of the future. We can, however, 
define guidelines which will aid in the reso-
lution of such an issue as the instant one. 
[6] We note, first, that we deal here 
with a case in which plaintiff suffered a 
shock which resulted in physical injury and 
we confine our ruling to that case. In de-
termining, in such a case, whether defen-
dant should reasonably foresee the injury 
to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, 
whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty 
of due care, the courts will take into ac-
count such factors as the following: (1) 
Whether plaintiff was located near the 
scene of the accident as contrasted with one 
who was a distance away from it. (2) 
Whether the shock resulted from a direct 
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the 
sensory and contemporaneous observance 
of the accident, as contrasted with learn-
ing of the accident from others after its 
occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the 
victim were closely related, as contrasted 
with an absence of any relationship or the 
presence of only a distant relationship. 
The evaluation of these factors will in-
dicate the degree of the defendant's fore-
would be indefensible. As a result, in 
awarding recovery for emotional shock 
upon witnessing another's injury or 
denth, we cannot draw a line between the 
plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of 
physical impact and the plaintiff who is 
in the zone of danger of emotional im-
pact. The recovery of the one, within 
the guidelines set forth infra, is as much 
compelled as that of the other. 
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seeability: obviously defendant is more elude that the accident and injury were not 
likely to foresee that a mother who ob- reasonably foreseeable and that therefore 
serves an accident affecting her child will defendant owed no duty of due care to 
suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger plaintiff. In future cases the courts will 
witness will do so. Similarly, the degree draw lines of demarcation upon facts more 
of foreseeability of the third person's in- subtle than the compelling ones alleged in 
jury is far greater in the case of his COn- the complaint before us. 
temporaneous observance of the accident 
than that in which he subsequently learns 
of it. The defendant is mOTC likely to fore-
see that shock to the nearby, witnessing 
mother will cause physical harm than to 
anticipate that someone distant from the 
accident will suffer more than a temporary 
emotional reaction. All these elements, of 
course, shade into each other; the fixing of 
obligation, intimately tied into the facts, de-
pends upon each case. 
[7] In light of these factors the court 
will determine whether the accident and 
harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such 
reasonable foreseeability does not turn on 
whether the particular defendant as an in-
dividual would have in actuality foreseen 
the exact accident and loss j it contemplates 
that courts, on a case-to-case basis, ana-
lyzing all the circumstances, will decide 
what the ordinary man under such circum-
stances should reasonably have foreseen. 
The courts thus mark out the areas of li-
ability, excluding the remote and unex-
pected. 
[8] In the instant case, the presence of 
all the above factors indicates that plain-
tiff has alleged a sufficient prima facie 
Case. Sur~ly the negligent driver who 
causes the death of a young child may rea-
sonably expect that the mother will not be 
far distant and will upon witnessing the 
accident suffer emotional trauma. As Dean 
Prosser has stated: "when a child is en-
dangered, it is not beyond contemplation 
that its mother will be somewhere in the 
vicinity, and will suffer serious shock." 
(Prosser, The Law of Torts, supra, at p. 
353. See also 2 Harper & James, The Law 
of Torts, supra, at p. 1039.) 
We are not now called upon to decide 
whether, in the absence or reduced weight 
of some of the above factors, we would con-
441 P.2d-56V~ 
The coltrts have in the past, in analogous 
situations, drawn the limits of liability, ap-
plying general guidelines such as those 
above set forth to the specific facts of the 
cases. As examples of that process of def-
inition we set forth the history of the Hopen 
car" cases, the rulings on recovery by per-
sons not in privity of contract for defend-
ant's negligence in drafting instrnments, 
the decisions on the intentional infliction 
of emotional injury, the modern English 
cases, and some illustrative opinions that 
adjudicate the specific issue before us. 
The ability of courts to limit liability 
predicated on tests largely based upon fore-
seeability is well illustrated by the "open 
car" cases. The p~ototype case is the suit 
against the owner of a vehicle for damage 
caused plaintiff by a third party who can 
commandeer the vehicle because of the 
owner's carelessness in leaving the keys in-
side. In Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal. 
2d 772, 285 P.2d 269, we posited liability on 
the owner of a bulldozer because of a 
"foreseeable risk of intermeddling" (p. 776, 
285 P.2d 269), noting especially the great 
danger the bulldozer created and the special 
temptation it presented to third parties. 
Similarly, in Hergenrether v. East, supra, 
61 Cal.2d 440. 39 Cal.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164, 
we upheld sttch liability of a truck owner on 
the basis of Hgreater potentiality of foresee-
able risk" (p. 444, 39 Cal.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 
16-1) because of the possible danger of the 
vehicle, the time for which it was unat-
tended, and the type of persons who fre-
quent the neighborhood in which it was left. 
These decisions have not led to untram-
meled liability. Rather, applying the fore-
seeability test, the courts have held that the 
mere act of leaving a key in an automobile, 
although it may possibly raise a foreseeable 
risk that the car will be stolen, does not in-
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crease the risk of injury to other property 
and hence' does not warrant liability: 
"[e]ven if she could have foreseen the 
theft, she had no reason to believe that the 
thief would be an incompetent driver." 
(Richards v.,.Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 
66, 271 P.2d 23, 27.) In short, "each ca~ 
must be considered on its own facts to de-
termine whether the [situation] in toto jus-
tifies the conclusion that the foreseeable 
risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and 
that the defendant owner or one in charge 
of a vehicle has a duty to third persons in 
the class of the plaintiffs to refrain from 
subjecting them' to such risk." (Hergen-
rether v. East, Sllpra, 61 Cal.2d 440, 445, 39 
Cal.Rptr. 4, 7, 393 P.2d 164, 167; see also 
England v. Mapes Produce Co. (1965) 238 
Cal.App.2d 120, 47 Cal.Rptr. 506; Murray 
v. Wright (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 589, 333 
P.2d 111.) 
In another category of cases, those in-
volving the liability of a tortfeasor to a 
third person with whom he was not in 
privity of contract for negligent draftman-
ship of a legal document, we have recognized 
the right of the injured party to compen-
sation and s~t out guidelines for the deter-
mination of future cases. In Lucas v. 
Hamm (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 583, 588, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, we applied this rule 
to an attorney who drew a defective will, 
thereby causing damage to the intended 
third-party beneficiary. (See also Biakanja 
v. Irving (1958) -19 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 
16.) 
In sanctioning recovery for injury caused 
by intentional infliction of mental distress, 
this court did not defer to the argument 
that liability should not be imposed because 
of the possible future difficulty in delimit-
ing the area of liability. Defendants urged 
that if recovery were to be allowed for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, 
actions would soon be forthcoming based 
upon every minor personal insult or :indig-
nity. We said: "That administrativ',e dif-
ficulties do not justify the denial of :relief 
for serious invasions of mental and', emo-
tional tranquility is demonstrated by the 
cases recognizing the right of privacy." 
(State Rubbish etc. Ass'n v. Siliznoff, su-
pra, 38 Cal.2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286.) 
We rejected the contention "that to allow 
recovery in the absence of physical injury 
will open the door to unfounded claims and 
a flood of litigation, and that the require-
ment that there be physical injury is neces-
sary to insure that serious mental suffering 
actually occurred" (State Rubbish etc. Ass'n 
v. Siliznoff, supra, 38 Cal.2d 330, 338, 240 
P.2d 282, 286). 
Indeed, the argument that Hthere is no 
point at which such actions would stop" is 
no more plausible today than when it was 
advanced in \Vinterbottom v. Wright (18-12) 
10 M. & W. 109, 111. History has exposed 
the fallacy of the claim that abolition of 
privity in enterprise liability cases would 
lead to Hthe most absurd and outrageous 
conseqnences, to which I can see no limit" 
(p. 114). In taking another giant step for-
ward, in imposing product liability in tort, 
we were not halted by the spectre of an in-
ability to pre-judge every futnre case. The 
setting of boundaries upon that doctrine 
makes the problem of fixing lines of limita-
tion here appear, by comparison, almost 
miniscule. The widening of the area of li-
ability and the possibility of the encourage-
ment of unfounded and indefinable claims 
in the products liability field was sweeping: 
here we deal with a comparatively isolated 
and unusual situation. We do not believe 
that the fear that we cannot sllccessfll1iy 
adjudicate future cases of this sort, pursuant 
to the suggested guidelines: should bar re-
covery in an otherwise meritorious cause. 
The fear of an inability to fix boundaries 
has not impelled the conrts of England to 
deny recovery for emotional trauma caused 
by witnessing the death or injury of another 
dne to defendant's negligence. We set forth 
the holdings of some English cases merely 
to demonstrate that courts can formulate 
and apply such limitations of liability. 
The first and classic case, Hambrook v. 
Stokes Bros., supra 1 K.B. 141, rejected the 
argument that recovery should be denied 
because of possible administrative dif-
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ficulty. In Hambrook the defendant's serv- 912. 920, quoting from King v. PhiIlips 
ant left a truck parked at the top of a steep [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, 441, opinion by Denning, 
and narrow street with the engine running. L.J.) 
The deceased, a pregnant woman, had walk- Professor John Fleming of the School of 
cd with her children on their way to school Law, Boalt Hall, University of California, 
to the point where they turned onto the in a careful analysis of the '~evelopment of 
street where the truck was parked. Because English law on this subject, first explains, 
the driver did not take proper precautions, HIt is evident, of course, that to the extent 
the truck started itself down the hill and of denying redress for certain kinds of neg-
struck onc of the children. Although she ligently inflicted harm, the law is in effect 
herself was never in danger, the mother withholding its protective mantle from cor-
saw the runaway truck and feared greatly responding human interests that may ac-
for the safety of her children. Upon in- cordingly be infringed with impunity. To 
quiry she found that one of the children refuse a remedy for nervous shock is the 
had been seriously injured j several months equivalent of refusing to accede to an indi-
later both the mother and the foetus were vidual's claim for safeguarding his emotion-
dead. The trial court directed the jury that al security. It is also the same as saying 
the father's suit for loss of services could that there is no 'duty' owed to exercise 
succeed 'only if the death were caused by reasonable care to avoid inflicting this type 
the mother's fear for her own safety, but of loss or injury. Although no longer 
the appellate court held that the plaintiff quite as fashionable in this particular con-
could recover even if the fear for the chil- text, the same idea can also, finally, be ex-
dren brought about her demise. pressed by asserting that such damage is 
Faced with the contention that their hold-
ing would increase the number of suits and 
foment possible fraudulent claims, Lord 
Justice Atkin quoted this passage: "'I 
should be sorry to adopt a rule which would 
bar all such claims on grounds of policy 
alone, and in order to prevent the possible 
success of unrighteous or groundless ac-
tions. Such a course involves the denial of 
redress in meritorious cases, and it neces-
sarily implies a certain degree of distrust, 
which I do not share, in the capacity of 
legal tribunals to get at the truth in this 
class of claim.'" (Hambrook v. Stokes 
Bros., supra, quoting from Dttlieu v. White 
and Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681, opinion 
by Kennedy, J.) 
I n a recent application of the H ambrook 
rule, an English court permitted recovery 
by a widow of a man who developed severe 
psychoneurotic symptoms as a result of har-
rowing experiences, not involving his per-
sonal safety, white serving as a rescuer at 
a gruesome train wreck The court stated 
that the H ltest of liability for shock is fore-
seeability of injury by shock.''' (Chadwick 
v. British Railways Board [1967] 1 W.L.R. 
'too remote' or, what amounts to the same 
thing, that the defendant's negligence was 
not its 'proximate cause'." (Fleming, An 
Introduction to the Law of Torts (1967) 
p. 46.) 
After explaining that certain English 
cases manipulated doctrinal approaches "to 
subserve ulterior purposes" in granting re-
covery in some situations and denying it in 
others, Fleming states that "a long-delayed 
change in attitude may perhaps be discerned 
in the latest decision by the Court of Appeal 
[Boardman v. Sanderson (1964) 1 W.L.R. 
1317 (C.A.)], which sustained a father's 
claim for a mental shock he suffered upon 
hearing the screams of his boy when the 
latter's foot was negligently caught under 
the wheel of the defendant's car from which 
father and son had just alighted inside a 
service garage. Neither did the father fear 
for his own, safety nor did he so much as 
even see the accident. Indeed, the claimant 
was not even a. female-the prototype plain-
tiff in these cases being almost exclusively 
concerned with pregnancy injuries. Yet 
the court considered it sufficient to say that 
a duty was owed not only to the boy but 
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also to ~is near relatives, who, to the defen-
dant's kn'owledge, were on the premises 
within earshot and likely to come upon the 
scene if any injury befell him. It remains 
to be seen whether this relaxation, slight 
as it may be, might not eventually be extend-
ed to relatives whose presence, though not 
actually known, was yet foreseeable in ac-
cordance with the prevailing test custom-
arily applied to claims for physical in-
juries." (Italics in original; fn. omitted.) 
(Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of 
Torts, supra, at p. 54.) 
The English courts have likewise marked 
out areas of liability, excluding those in-
juries that are remote and unexpected. 
Thus a distinguished English court has held 
that the physical injury of a casual bystand-
er resulting from shock or fright upon wit-
nessing an accident would present so unusu-
al and hence unforeseeable an event as to 
warrant a directed verdict for defendant. 
"The driver of a car or vehicle, even though 
careless, is entitled to assume that the ordin-
ary frequenter of the streets has sufficient 
fortitude to endure such incidents as may 
from time to time be expected to occur in 
them, including the noise of a collision and 
the sight of injuries to others, and is not to 
be considered negligent towards one who 
does not possess the customary phlegm." 
(Italics added.) (Bourhill v. Young (1943) 
A.C. 92, 117 (Porter, L.J.); see, id. at pp. 98 
(Thankerton, L.J.), 101 (Russel!, L.J.), 104 
(MacMillan, L.J.), and 107 (Wright, L.J.); 
King v; Phillips, supra, 1 Q.B. 429, 442.) 
Thus we see no good reason why the 
general rules of tort law, including the con-
cepts of negligence, proximate cause, and 
foreseeability, long applied to all other 
6. In Lindley a l65-pound chimpanzee had 
entered plaintiff's house and attacked 
her children, whom she rescued from it. 
The court recognized that the ('oncern 
of the mother for the safety of the child-
ren as well us conccrn for her own safety 
could have contributed to her fright. It 
states: "\Vhile, of course, Mrs. Lindley 
wns grently and perhaps chiefly concern-
ed for her children * * * there is 
nothing in the testimony to indicate that 
she was not concerned for. her own 
types of injury, should not govern the case 
now before us. Any questions that the 
cause raises "will be solved most justly by 
applying general principles of duty and 
negligence, and * * * mechanical rules 
of thumb which are at variance with these 
principles do more harm than good." . (2 
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, supra, 
p. 1039; fn. omitted.) "The refusal to ap-
ply these general rules to actions for this 
particular kind of physical injury is nothing 
short of a denial of justice." (Throckmor-
ton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 Harv.L. 
Rev. 260, Z77; fn. omitted.) 
In short, the history of the cases does not 
show the development of a logical rule but 
rather a series of changes and abandon-
ments. Upon the argument in each sitna-
tion that the courts' draw a Maginot Line 
to withstand an onslaught of false claims, 
the cases have assumed a variety of pos-
tures. At first they insisted that there be 
no recovery for emotional trauma at all. 
(Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 
supra, S9 Ca1.2d 295, dissenting opinion by 
Peters, J., p. 328 fn. 9, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 
P.2d 513.) Retreating from this position, 
they gave relief for such trauma only if 
physical impact occurred. (Id. at p. 325 fn. 
4, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513.) They 
then abandoned the requirement for physi-
cal impact but insisted that the victim fear 
for her own safety (Amaya v. Home Ice, 
Fuel & Supply Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d 295, 
29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), holding that 
a mother could recover for fear for her 
children's safety if she simultaneously en-
tertained a personal fear for herself. 
(Lindley v. Knowlton, supra, 179 Cal. 298, 
176 P. 440.) 6 They stated that the mother 
safety." (179 Cal. 302, 176 P. p. 441.) 
As a basis for reversal of plaintiff's v(>r-
dict defendant nrg(>d thnt the court should 
have instru<'ted the jury thnt "no rp-
covery may be had on account of fright 
produced by n})lll·phcndcd tl:mgt.'r or peril 
to a third IH'I'Son." The court affirmcil. 
saying that the ('iT('ulllstnnces made "it 
impossiblc that she should have been ilt'-
void of fenr for herself" and that th<' 
instruction was therefore properly re-
fused. Hence the court in substance sus-
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need only be in the "zone of danger" (Reed tury which can claim no current credence. 
v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 47, 319 No good reason compels our captivity to an 
P.2d 80). The final anomaly would be the indefensible orthodoxy. 
instant case in which the sister, who ob- The judgment is reversed. 
served the accident, would be granted re-
covery because she was in the "zone of 
danger," but the mother, not far distant, 
would be barred from recovery. 
The successive abandonment of these 
positions exposes the weakness of artificial 
abstractions which bar recovery contrary to 
the general rules. Ar:. the commentators 
have suggested, the problem should be 
solved by the application of the principles 
of tort, not by the creation of exceptions to 
them. Legal history shows that artificial 
islands of exceptions, created from the fear 
that the legal process will not work, usually 
do not withstand the waves of reality and, 
in time, descend into oblivion. 
[9] We have explained that recovery 
here will not expose the courts to false 
claims or a flood of litigation. The test 
that we have set forth will aid in the proper 
resolution of future cases. Indeed, the gen-
eral principles of tort law are acknowledged 
to work successfully in all other cases of 
emotional trauma. 
Yet for some artificial reason this de-
limitation of-liability is alleged to be un-
workable in the most egregious case of 
them all: the mother's emotional trauma 
at the witnessed death of her child. If we 
stop at this point, however, we must neces-
sarily question and reject not merely re-
covery here, but the viability of the judicial 
process for ascertaining liability for tor-
tious conduct itself. To the extent that it is 
inconsistent with our ruling here, we there-
fore overrule Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & 
Supply Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513. 
To deny recovery would be to chain this 
state to an outmoded rule of the 19th cen-
tnined recovery for fright based upon a 
combination of fears, those arising from 
fear of the mother for the children as 
well as for herself. 
I. In Amaya the trial court sustained a 
general demurrer to the complaint and 
PETERS, MOSK, and SULLIVAN, JJ., 
concur. 
DISSENTING OPINION 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
I dissent for the reasons set forth in 
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 297-315, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513. In my opinion 
that case was correctly decided and should 
not be overruled. 
DISSENTING OPINION 
BURKE, Justice. 
As recently as 1963 this court, in Amaya 
v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 
2d 295, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513, 
thoroughly studied and expressly rejected 
the proposition (pp. 298-299, 29 Cal.Rptr. 
33, 379 P.2d 513) that tort liability may be 
predicated on fright or nervous shock (with 
consequent bodily illness) induced solely 
by the plaintiff's apprehension of negli-
gently caused danger or injury to a third 
person. As related in our Amaya opinion, 
plaintiff there was the mother of a 17-
month-old boy who saw him struck by a 
truck; accordingly our ruling necessarily 
included all mothers of small children who 
observe them being injured. Yet today 
this court's Amaya decision is overruled by 
an opinion which disdains any discussion 
whatever of the history and policy of perti-
nent law painstakingly set forth in Amaya. 
Everyone of the arguments advanced in 
today's opinion was considered by this 
court and rejected, expressly or by fair 
implication, in Amaya.l Further, as 
dismissed the action. The Court of Ap-
peal reversed, and in its opinion pro-
nounced the doctrine that is revived in 
the majority opinion here. (See Cnl. 
App., 23 Cal.Rptr. 131.) Upon petition 
this court granted a hearing, thereby nul-
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Amaya points out (p. 304 of 59 Cal.2d, 
29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), in every 
jurisdiction-:in this country that had ruled 
on the point at issue the decisions up to 
that time (1963) were unanimous in up-
holding the rule of nonliability. ~/ 
So far as has been discovered, jn~~t a 
single such jurisdiction has an appellate 
court rule to the contrary since Amaya.2 
But the majority make no attempt in to-
day's opinion-as apparently they could 
not-to buttress their result with citations 
of cases based on American law, to say 
nothing of that of California. Instead, we 
are offered two English cases applying the 
1925 Hambrook case (Hambrook v. Stokes 
Bros. [1925] I K.B. 141), whose ruling we 
expressly rejected in Amaya (pp. 303-304 
[fn. 4], and 313, of 59 Cal.2d, 29 Cal.Rptr. 
33, 379 P.2d 513), and which, as already 
stated has not been followed or approved 
by any jurisdiction in this country. 
The majority; obviously recognizing that 
they are now embarking upon a first ex-
cursion into the "fantastic realm of in-
finite liability" (Amaya, at p. 315 of 59 
Cal.2d, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), 
undertake to provide so-called "guidelines" 
"for the future. But notwithstanding the 
limitations which these "guidelines" pur-
port to impose, it is only reasonable to ex-
pect pressure upon our trial courts to make 
their future rulings conform to the spirit 
of the new elasticity proclaimed by the 
majority. 
Moreover, the majority's "guidelines" 
(ante, 441 P.2d pp. 920, 921) are simply a 
Jifying the Court of Appeal opinion. Our 
opinion affirmed the trial court. 
2. The courts of two states have expressly 
denied recovery: see Barber v. Pollock 
(1963) 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (wife 
witnessed from inside the house an ac-
cident in which her husband was killed); 
Jelley v. LaFlame (N.H.1968) 238 A.2d 
728 (mother standing on side of highway 
witnessed an accident in which he'r 6-
year-old daughter, who had alighted from 
a school bus, was crushed to dca th by; a 
truck); Knaub v. Gotwalt (1066) 422 
Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646, in which the court 
expressly rejected even the "impact" 
restatement of those suggested earlier by 
Professor Prosser (Prosser, Tort's, 2d ed., 
1955, p. 182); they have already been dis-
cussed and expressly rejected by this court 
in Amaya (pp. 312-313, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 
379 P.2d 513). Upon analysis, their seem-
ing certainty evaporates into arbitrariness, 
an inexplicable distinctions appear.3 As 
we asked in Amaya: What if the plain-
tiff was honestly mistaken in believing 
the third person to be in danger or to be 
seriously injured? What if the third per-
son had assumed the risk involved? How 
"close" must the relationship/ be between 
the plaintiff and the third person? I. e., 
what if the third person was the plain-
tiff's beloved niece or nephew, grand-
parent, fiance, or lifelong friend, more 
dear to the plaintiff than her immediate 
family? Next, how "near" must the plain-
tiff have been to the scene of t~e acci-
dent, and how "soon" must shock have 
been felt? Indeed, what is the magic in 
the plaintiff's being actually present? Is 
the shock any less real if the mother does 
not know of the accident until her injured 
child is brought into her home? On the 
other hand, is it any less real if the mother 
is physically present at the scene but is 
nevertheless unaware of the danger or in-
jury to her child until after the accident 
has occurred? No answers to these ques-
tions are to be found in today's majority 
opinion. Our trial courts, however, will 
not so easily escape the burden of distin-
guishing between litigants on the basis of 
such artificial and unpredictable distinc-
tions. 
rule and notcd that, as shown in 1S 
A.L.R.2d 220, virtually no jurisdiction 
permits recovery to a mere witness not 
in the zone of danger. 
3. Thus the Supreme Court of New Ramp· 
shire has recently recognized that to ap-
prove recovery by mothers of small chi!· 
dren, as do the majority here, would cre· 
ate "the need '" '" '" to impose arbi· 
trnry and illogical limitations to preven t 
the undue extension of the liability of an 
alleged negligent operator such as-the de-
fendant in this casc." (Jelley v. LaFlame 
(1968) supra, 238 A.2d 728, 730.) 
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Further, and again contrary to the as- pairment resulting from emotional dis-
sertions of the majority (ante, 441 P.2d tress occasioned by apprehension of the 
pp. 915, 916), no fallacy or incongruity ap- peril of others] rests upon the prime hy-
pears in the rute permitting recovery to pothesis that allowance of sU'ch an action 
one within the physical zone of danger for would lead to successful assertion of fraud-
trauma suffered from fear of impact, but ulent claims," (italics added) is contro-
denying it to a person outside that zone. verted by the very case cited in support. 
The impact feared must be to oneself; and (Waube v. Warrington, supra, 216 Wis. 
it must be an objective fear-not merely 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, SOl.) Instead of 
that of an excessively imaginative or timid reliance on any such "prime hypothesis," 
plaintiff. As pointed out in the leading the Wisconsin court had this to say in 
case of Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 WaH-be: "The answer to this question can-
Wis. 603, 612-6\3, 258 N.W. 497, 500- not be reached solely by logic, nor is· it 
501, HIt is one thing to say that as to clear that" 1t can be entirely disposed of 
those who are put in peril of physical im- by a consideration of what the defendant 
pact, impact is immaterial if phfsical in- ought reasonably to have anticipated as a 
jury is caused by shock arising from the consequence of his wrong. The answer 
peril. It is the foundation of cases hold- must be reached by balancing the social in-
ing to this liberal ruling, that the person terests involved in order to ascertain how 
affrighted or sustaining shock was actu- far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right 
ally put in peril of physical impact, and may justly and expediently be extended. 
under these conditions it was considered It is our conclusion that they can neither 
immaterial that the physical impact did justly nor expediently be extended to any 
not materialize. It is quite another thing recovery for physical injuries sustained 
to say that those who are out of the field by one out of the range of ordinary physi-
of physical danger through impact -shall cal peril as a result of the shock of wit-
have a legally protected right---to be free nessing another's danger. Such conse-
from emotional distress occasioned by the quences are so unusual and extraordinary, 
peril of others, when that distress results viewed after the event, that a user of the 
in physical impairment." (Italics added.) highway may be said not to subject others 
Thus, California's rule that a plaintiff's to an unreasonable risk of them by the 
reasonable fear for his own safety is com- careless management of his vehicle. Fur-
pensable presents neither an argument for thermore, the liability imposed by such a 
the same rule as to fear for others, nor a doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the 
danger of recovery based on the plaintiff's culpability of the negligent tort-feasor,-
false claims of fear for himself.4 would put an unreasonable burden upon 
The assertion of the majority (ante, 441 users of the highway, open the way to 
P .2d p. 917) that "The denial of 'duty' in fraudulent claims, and enter a field that 
the instant situation [i. e., physical im- has no sensible or just stopping point." 
4. Contrary to the assertion of the ma-
jority (ante, 441 P.2d p. 924), no Cali-
fornia case has held that "a mother could 
recover for fear for her children's safety 
if she simultaneously entertained n per-
sonal fear for herself." As correctly 
stated in Amaya (p. 300 of 59 Ca1.2d, 29 
Cnl.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), Lindley v. 
Knowlton (1918) 179 Cnl. 298, 176 P. 
440, hel(I only thnt linbility may be pred-
icated upon fright and consequent illness 
induced by the plaintiff's remwnnble fenr 
for her oum safety, even 1vhen the plnin-
tiff mny nlso have feared for the safety 
of her children. And as likewise correct-
ly stated in Amaya (p. 302, 29 Cal.Rptr. 
33, 379 P.2d 513), the holding in, Reed v. 
Moore (1957) 156 Cal.Apl).2d 43, 47, 
319 P.2d 80, was that a wife who wns 
outside the zone of danger but witnessed 
a collision in which her husband was in-
jured C!ould not recover. Neither Lindlev 
nor Reed holds, or even suggests, thnt a 
plninHff mny recover for fear for the 
safety of nnother if she cnn estnblish 
that she herself was in the zone of 
danger. 
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As this court declared in Amaya (p. 315 
of 59 Ca1.2d p. 45 of 29 Cal.Rptr., p. 529 
of 379 P.2d) , there is good sense in the 
conclusion of the court in Waube that 
lithe liability imposed by such a doctrine 
is wholly out of proportion to the culpa-
bility of the negligent tort-feasor"; fur-
ther, to permit recovery by e"very person 
who might adversely feel some lingering 
effect of the defendant's conduct would 
throw 11S into "the fantastic realm of in-
finite liability." Yet the majority opinion 
in the present case simply omits to either 
mention or discuss the injustice to Cali-
fornia defendants flowing from such a 
disproportionate extension of their liability 
-an injustice which plainly constituted a 
"prime hypothesis" for rejection of the 
liability sought to be imposed by the plain-
tiffs in Waube and in Amaya.. (See also 
Jelley v. LaFlame (N.H.1968) supra, 238 
A.2d 728, 730, citing with approval and fol-
lowing this ground of decision expressed 
in Waube and in Amaya.) 
Additionally, the majority fail to explain 
their bare assertion (ante, 441 P.2d p. 
916) that contributory negligence of Erin 
will defeat any recovery by plaintiff moth-
er and sister.ls The familiar and heretofore 
unquestioned principle is that the relation-
ships of parent and child or of husband 
and wife in themselves furnish no basis 
for imputation of. contributory negligence. 
(Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law, Torts, § 
341, p. 1542; Rest., Torts 2d, § 488.) Is 
this principle now abrogated in California? 
If so, it is a ruling extending far beyond 
the confines of the particular issue now 
before us, and reaches potentially every 
negligence action in which the plaintiffs 
are members of the same family. 
It appears to me that in the light of 
today's majority opinion the matter at 
issue should be commended to the atten-
tion of the Legislature of this state. Five 
years have elapsed since our Amaya deci-
sion, during which that body has not un-
5. Neither does the majority opinion en-
lighten us as to how the contributory 
negligence of either (a) plaintiff mother 
dertaken to change the law we there de-
clared. We may presume, therefore, that 
the limitations upon liability there affirmed 
comport with legislative views. But if all 
alleged California tortfeasors, including 
motorists, home and other property own-
ers, and governmental entities, are, now 
to be faced with the concept of potentially 
infinite liability beyond any rational rela-
tionship to their culpability, then surely 
the point has been reached at which. the 
Legislature should reconsider the entire 
subject and alIow all interests affected to 
be heard. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
McCOMB, J., concurs, 
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Ernest 'J. ZEMKE, Petitioner, 
Y. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS 
BOARD, W. S. Sham ban and Com .. 
pany, et al., Respondents. 
L. A. 29533. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
June 28, 1968. 
Workmen's compensation case wherein 
review was sought of Appeals Board's opin-
ion and order denying reconsideration of 
its prior apportionment. The Supreme 
Court, Tobriner, J., held that finding that 
50% of petitioner's permanent disability 
was attributable to his preexisting asymp-
tomatic arthritic condition was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
Annulled and remanded. 
or (b) plaintiff sister will 8ssertedIy de-
fent nny recovery by the other, 
